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International Wrongs, State Laws and
Presidential Policies
MICHAEL

D. RAMSEY*

In Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG,1 the Ninth Circuit
invalidated a California law on the grounds that it conflicted with,
and therefore was preempted by, the President's foreign policy. In
the comments below, I suggest that this decision is counter to the
Supreme Court's 2008 decision in Medellin v. Texas' and conflicts
with basic principles of U.S. constitutional law. More broadly, I
will consider the effect of presidential policies on state laws that,
like the California law at issue in Movsesian, seek to provide or
promote remedies for international wrongs.
Movsesian invalidated California Code of Civil Procedure
Section 354.4, which provides jurisdiction and an extended statute
of limitations for California residents to bring insurance claims
arising out of the unrest in the Ottoman Empire between 1915 and
1923. This unrest principally targeted ethnic Armenians and has
been described as a genocide against the Armenian community.
That designation, though, is deeply contested, especially by the
current government of Turkey. The California statute adopted the
phrase "Armenian Genocide victim" as a statutory definition for
persons who had suffered injuries during the period, but in fact no
legal consequence turned upon the statute's use of this phrase, and
Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. The author
participated as counsel to amici curiae Professors of Constitutional Law and
Foreign Relations Law in support of Plaintiffs-Appellants in Weiss v.
Assicurazione Generali,S.P.A., No. 05-5612 (2d Cir. 2010), in which some of the
arguments presented here were further developed. The author also participated
in a amici curiae brief supporting the state of Texas in Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S.
491 (2008), and served as consulting co-counsel to the California Insurance
Commissioner in American Insurance Association v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 394
(2003).
1. Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 578 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2009).
2. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
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the victims to whom the statute extended protection were those of
"Armenian or other ancestry."3 Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit
held that because the federal executive branch had resisted
congressional efforts to label the events in the Ottoman Empire a
genocide, the California statute's use of that term caused the entire
statute to be preempted.
As I will describe below, Movsesian's result gives
extraordinary and unconstitutional preemptive power to the
President. The issue has broad implications. Presidential policies
can be formulated and announced easily and unilaterally, with few
if any procedural checks or input from other branches. They can
be stated broadly-and ambiguously, and courts are likely to defer
to subsequent interpretations of them by the executive branch.
Further, as shown by Movsesian itself, courts in cases of doubt are
likely to invalidate the state law in its entirety rather than search
for ways to reconcile the two. In effect, then, the Movsesian
principle would give the President supervisory power over state
law, with authority to displace a broad range of state laws the
President finds inconvenient. This result is contrary to the
Constitution's designation of Congress, not the President, as the
nation's lawmaking body, and to the Constitution's designation of
treaties and statutes, but not presidential policies, as the "supreme
Law of the Land."
Movsesian's result is also inconsistent with the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Medellin. Though the Movsesian court gave
Medellin only slight attention, Medellin involved the same issue-a
claim that presidential foreign policy should preempt inconsistent
state law. The Court in Medellin ruled firmly against the President,
even though it found the foreign policy implications invoked by
the President to be "plainly compelling."5 The simple and
determinative constitutional rule, the Court held, is that the
President is not a lawmaker.
I. BASIC PRINCIPLES

The Constitution sets forth two basic principles of separation

3.

CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.4

4. Movsesian, 578 F.3d at 1063.
5. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 524.

(West 2009).
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of powers and federalism that govern our discussion. First, state
law applies unless it is displaced by federal law. Second, the
President does not make federal law.
Under the first principle, federal law can displace state law in
two ways: if the Constitution itself excludes a state from acting, or
if an act of federal lawmaking overrides the state law. The
Constitution either expressly or implicitly prohibits the states from
engaging in certain activities. Article I, Section 10, for example,
lists certain actions the states cannot take, or can take only with
Congress' consent, such as engaging in war or making treaties and
other international agreements.6 Further, some (though not all)
constitutional grants of power to branches of the federal
government may be exclusive (that is, by negative implication they
exclude the states from acting even if no conflicting federal
lawmaking has taken place). The dormant commerce clause
doctrine, which excludes states from certain kinds of regulation of
interstate commerce even in the absence of federal legislation is an
important though controversial example.
Absent a constitutional prohibition, state law is valid unless
displaced by federal law. Article VI sets forth the preemptive
categories of federal law: statutes passed "in Pursuance" of the
Constitution and treaties made "under the Authority of the United
States." Notably, these provisions impose material procedural
hurdles to the creation of federal law. It must be created (a) with
the approval of majorities of both of the two separately-elected
6. .U.S.CONST. art. 1, § 10.

7. See Brannon P. Denning, Confederation-Era Discrimination Against Interstate
Commerce and the Legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 94 KY. L.J. 37
(2005); Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the
Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569 (1987). It is important to
distinguish executive preemption, as adopted in Movsesian, from the related idea that
states may be constitutionally precluded from certain foreign affairs activities by the
Constitution's assignment of foreign affairs powers to the national government. The U.S.
Supreme Court expressed the latter proposition in Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429
(1968), although it has been sharply criticized. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts,
Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617 (1997); Michael D. Ramsey, The
Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The Original Understanding of Foreign Policy
Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341 (1999). But see Carlos Manuel Vdzquez,
W(h)ither Zschernig, 46 VILL L. REv. 1259 (2001) (offering a partial defense). Zschemig
held that some state laws implicating foreign affairs are unconstitutional even where there
has been no federal action (somewhat in the manner of the dormant commerce clause),
Executive preemption, in contrast, holds that otherwise-constitutional state laws become
invalid to the extent they conflict with existing executive foreign policy.
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houses of Congress and of the President, (b) with a supermajority
of both houses, or (c) in the case of treaties, with the approval of
the President plus a supermajority of the Senate. Through this
structure, the President's lawmaking authority is exercised only in
conjunction with one or both of the houses of Congress.
Thus, the second principle arises from the first: the President
alone cannot invoke either of the lawmaking avenues of Article
VI. More fundamentally, Article 11, Section l's designation of the
President as holder of the "executive Power" shows the office's
lack of independent lawmaking authority. In eighteenth-century
terms, "executive" power was understood specifically in contrast
to "legislative" power, the power to make law. In England, the
king held the executive power, but a bedrock principle of
eighteenth-century English law was that the king, standing alone,
was not a lawmaker.8 As James Madison put it in FederalistNo. 47,
in England "[t]he magistrate in whom9 the whole executive power
resides cannot of himself make a law."
These basic principles came together in the U.S. Supreme
Court's most celebrated case on presidential power, Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer."0 In that case, President Harry
Truman famously directed federal seizure of major U.S. steel mills
when an impending strike threatened interruption of military
supplies to the war effort in Korea. The Court found the
President's order to be an unconstitutional lawmaking act.
Justice Hugo Black's opinion for the majority assumed the
first principle: that state law governed unless displaced by federal
law. The mill owners held property rights under state law. In the
absence of a conflicting federal act, the state law was obviously
constitutional and formed the baseline of rights to which the mill
owners could appeal. The question in the case was whether any
federal act displaced the state law. Since there was no conflicting
treaty or act of Congress, the question became whether the
President's order had that effect.
Black held that it did not, applying the second principle-the

RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION'S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION'S TEXT]; see 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 142-43,261 (1765).
8.

MICHAEL D.

91-114 (2007) [hereinafter

9. THE FEDERALISTNo. 47, at 303 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
10. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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President was not a lawmaker. As he stated:
In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to
see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he
is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the
lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise
and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is
neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which
the President is to execute. The first section of the first article
says that "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States .... ,1"
Black's opinion, though majestic in its simplicity, did not quite
explain one key point. Black did not say why he regarded the
President's act as a lawmaking act. He wrote that "[t]he
President's order does not direct that a congressional policy be
executed in a manner prescribed by Congress-it directs that a
presidential policy be executed in a manner prescribed by the
President,"' 2 thus equating policymaking with lawmaking. But that
explanation is plainly incomplete. Especially in foreign affairs, the
President routinely makes presidential policy that is not Congress'
policy, and then implements it in various ways. For example, most
diplomatic communications are within this description: the
President decides what message should be communicated to13
foreign nations and then directs his diplomats to communicate it.
There is, though, an obvious explanation, and Black likely had it in
mind without expressing it. The President's action in Youngstown,
unlike the President's routine diplomacy, changed the existing law.
Once we see state law as the baseline (as, constitutionally, it is), we
can see that the mill owners had a legal right which the President
sought to alter.
Black's failure to make this clear may have been the
inspiration for two celebrated concurrences in Youngstown that
regarded Black's opinion as overly simplistic and which over time
have gained as much or more prominence than Black's own
opinion. First, Justice Felix Frankfurter famously argued that
longstanding practice among the branches may create a "gloss"
upon the Constitution's text, and thus that Black's purely textual
11. Id. at 587-88.
12 Id. at 588.
13. For further discussion of this point, see
supra note 8, at 52-53.

RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION'S TEXT,
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argument might in some cases need refinement.'4 Second, even
more famously, Justice Robert Jackson argued that the
constitutionality of a presidential action should turn to some
extent on whether Congress had approved, disapproved, or
remained silent. In implementing his three-part evaluation,
Jackson contemplated assessing not only enacted statutes, but also
Congress' more general and informally expressed sense of the
matter."
Neither concurrence undermined Black's basic point. There
was no longstanding practice of Presidents altering domestic
property rights by decree,'" nor was there any indication that
Congress approved of the President's act (in fact, according to
Jackson, there was evidence that Congress disapproved)." Both
Jackson and Frankfurter can best be understood as seeking to
preserve flexibility in other policymaking areas, especially in
foreign affairs, where Presidents had acted and continued to act
without an express statutory policy behind them.
In sum, the constitutional problem in Youngstown was not
that the President independently formulated policy (something the
President does all the time) but that the President tried to make
that policy superior to existing law. Both Article II and Article VI
show this to be beyond the President's power. The President, like
the eighteenth-century English monarch, cannot use the executive
power to issue decrees with the force of law. Article VI confirms
this limit by setting forth the ways the federal government can act
with the force of law, and confining the President's role to action
in conjunction with one or both of the legislative branches.
II. MEDELLIN AND THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER
Youngstown, one might say, was a domestic law case
(although it took place against the background of the Korean

14. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 589-90.
15. Id. at 635-36.
16. Thus Frankfurter wrote that "[allthough the considerations relevant to the legal
enforcement of the principle of separation of powers seem to me more complicated and
flexible than may appear from what Mr. Justice BLACK has written, I join his opinion
because I thoroughly agree with the application of the principle to the circumstances of
this case." Id. at 589.
17. Id. at 639.
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War), and perhaps different principles should apply in foreign
affairs. In Medellin v. Texas, however, the Supreme Court applied
the basic principles underlying Youngstown to presidential foreign
policy preemption. Relying heavily on Youngstown, the Court
refused to give a presidential foreign policy preemptive effect over
conflicting state law. In doing so, the Court reaffirmed that these
basic principles do not apply differently merely because the
dispute involves foreign affairs.
In simplified form, Medellin involved the effect in U.S.
domestic law of a ruling by the International Court of Justice
(ICJ), "the principal judicial organ of the United Nations."18 A
treaty to which the United States is a party, the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR), requires that when
nations (including sub-national units such as U.S. states) arrest
foreign citizens, they allow the arrested person to contact that
person's embassy or consulate." This protection was until recently
routinely disregarded by state and local authorities in the United
States, presumably because they were unaware of it. In particular,
the state of Texas disregarded it in the case of Jos6 Medellin, a
Mexican national arrested, convicted and sentenced to death for a
horrific double murder in Houston. After conviction and
sentencing, Medellfn objected that Texas had failed to inform him
of his rights under the VCCR. The Texas courts denied relief on
the ground that the objection had come too late and state law
therefore did not allow him to raise it.2°
Meanwhile, Mexico began international proceedings on
behalf of Medellfn and other Mexican nationals similarly situated.
In response to Mexico's protests, the United States took the
position that while the VCCR had indeed been violated in
Medellfn's case, Medellfn had (as the Texas courts said) waived his
rights by failing to object, and further, the violation did not create
in Medellin a personal right to have his sentence reexamined. The
VCCR contains an optional protocol, to which the United States
was then a party, allowing the ICJ to resolve disputes over its
meaning.21 After the United States rejected Mexico's diplomatic
18. U.N. Charter art. 92.
19. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes,
Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
20. Medellin v. Texas, 552. U.S. 491,500-03 (2008).
21. Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24,
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overtures, Mexico filed suit against the United States in the ICJ on
behalf of its nationals. In Case Concerning Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (known as Avena), the ICJ rejected the U.S.
position and directed that Medellin's case be reexamined.'
President George W. Bush thereafter issued a memorandum
directing that state courts implement the ICJ decision by
reexamining the convictions and sentences of the persons affected
by the Avena decision (including Medellfn). In the memorandum,
the President stated:
I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as
President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States
of America, that the . United States will discharge its
international obligations under the decision of the International
Court of Justice in [A venal, by having State courts give effect to
the decision in accordance with general principles of comity in
cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in that
decision.23
Texas, however, refused to comply with either- the ICJ
decision or the President's memorandum, a position upheld by the.
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, again on the ground that Texas
law prohibited Medellfn from raising a belated VCCR objection.24
Thus, as the case came to the U.S. Supreme Court, the twofold
question was whether either the ICJ decision or the President's
memorandum overrode Texas law's procedural bar against late
objections.
The Court, per Chief Justice John Roberts, first rejected the
argument that the ICJ decision was preemptive of its own force.
Article 94 of the United Nations Charter bound the United States
to implement decisions of the ICJ (thus creating an international
obligation on the United States).2 5 But the Court held that Article

1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487.
22. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 56-57, 72
(Mar. 31). The ICJ directed the United States "to provide, by means of its own choosing,
review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences of the [affected] Mexican
nationals," and indicated that state procedural bars should not prevent such review and
reconsideration. Id.
23. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 503.
24. Exparte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
25. U.N. Charter art. 94, para. I ("Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to
comply with the decision of the [ICJ] in any case to which it is a party.").
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94 was not self-executing (that is, it had no direct effect in U.S.
domestic law) under the doctrine of Foster v. Neilson." Although
that conclusion may have been mistaken, either under the
Constitution's original understanding or under the best reading of
Foster,27 its effect was that Texas law was not preempted by any
Article VI source of federal law.
That left the President's memorandum as a possible source of
preemption. The President, who agreed with the Court's
assessment of Article 94, nonetheless argued that while the treaty
was not self-executing of its own force, his policy of implementing
it displaced any conflicting state law." Thus, Texas could not rely
on its procedural bar; not because it conflicted with the ICJ
decision, but because it conflicted with presidential foreign policy
as set forth in the memorandum. As the President's brief put it, the
President had power in foreign affairs to "establish binding rules
of decision that preempt contrary state law.""9
The Court flatly rejected the idea that the President had
power to convert a non-self-executing treaty into a binding
domestic legal obligation. Roberts' opinion tied the question
directly to the question of presidential lawmaking powers. As
Roberts put it:
Once a treaty is ratified without provisions clearly according it
domestic effect ... whether the treaty will ever have such effect
is governed by the fundamental constitutional principle that
"'[tihe power to make the necessary laws is in Congress; the
power to execute in the President.'" Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548
U.S. 557, 591 (2006) (quoting Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 139

26. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 503-23; see Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829). As the
Medellin Court explained, "while treaties may comprise international commitments...
they are not domestic law unless Congress has either enacted implementing statutes or the
treaty itself conveys an intention that it be self-executing and is ratified on these terms."
Id. at 505 (internal quotations omitted).
27. See Carlos Manuel Vizquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause
and the JudicialEnforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV 599 (2008); David L. Sloss,
Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a ConstitutionalFallacy,36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1
(2002); see also Medellin, 552 U.S. at 538-39 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the
Court on this point). But see Ernest A. Young, Treaties as "Partof Our Law," 88 TEX. L.
REV. 91,107-136 (2010) (defending Medellin's non-self-execution holding).
28. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Medellin
v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (No. 06-984), 2007 WL 1909462 [hereinafter U.S. Medellin
Brief].
29. Id. at 5.
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(1866) (opinion of Chase, C.J.)); see U.S. Const., Art. I, § 1
("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States"). As already noted, the terms of
a non-self-executing treaty can become domestic law only in the
same way as any other law-through passage of legislation by
both Houses of Congress, combined with either the President's
signature or a congressional override of a Presidential veto. See
Art. I, §7.3)
Thus, the Court's explanation proceeded in two steps: (1)
converting a non-self-executing treaty into a domestic legal
obligation that preempts state law is a lawmaking act; and (2) the
President is not a lawmaker. This approach follows directly from
Black's opinion in Youngstown, which Roberts cited directly,
quoting Black's aphorism that "the President's power to see that
the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a
lawmaker."'" Roberts also invoked Madison's Federalist No. 47
(which observed that "[t]he magistrate in whom the whole
executive power resides cannot of himself make a law").32 But,
Roberts continued, "[t]hat would, however, seem an apt
description of the asserted executive authority unilaterally to give
the effect of domestic law to obligations under a non-selfexecuting treaty. 33
Like Youngstown, Medellin reaffirms the basic constitutional
principles described above. In the absence of a conflicting federal
act, Texas' procedural bar was plainly constitutional and formed
the legal baseline of Medellfn's rights. Article 94, combined with
the ICJ judgment in Avena, would have altered that legal baseline
in accordance with Article VI had Article 94 been a valid selfexecuting treaty obligation. But once the Court concluded that it
was not self-executing, no Article VI law conflicted with Texas'

30. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 526.
31. id. (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952)).
Roberts also applied Justice Jackson's three-part Youngstown analysis, finding that
Congress had not acquiesced in the President's execution of ICJ judgments, and indeed
that the non-self-executing status of the treaty placed the situation in Jackson's third
category of congressional disapproval. id.at 1370-71.
32. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison), supra note 9, at 303. In FederalistNo.
47, Madison was actually speaking of the English system, but clearly he was equating it to
the U.S. constitutional system in this respect.
33. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 528.
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rule. The question, as the Court plainly and correctly understood,
was whether the non-Article VI presidential foreign policy could
have preemptive effect. The Court held it could not,
notwithstanding the President's power in foreign affairs and the
importance to U.S. foreign affairs of complying with Avena (an
interest that the Court found to be "plainly compelling").' The
simple constitutional proposition underlying the Court's
conclusion is - as Black said in Youngstown and the Court
repeated in Medellin - that the President is not a lawmaker.
III. INTERVENING CASES: THE ROAD FROM YOUNGSTOWNTO
MEDELLtIN

argued in Medellin that,
The President further
notwithstanding the basic propositions set forth above, intervening
case law recognized the President's power to displace state law as
needed to resolve disputes with foreign nations.35 This section
considers those cases to see if they provide reasons to change our
basic assessment of the Constitution and of Medellin's holding. As
set forth below, to the contrary they (and Medellin's treatment of
them) confirm it.
In 1981, the Court gave preemptive effect to a unilateral
executive agreement 6 in Dames & Moore v. Regan.' President
Carter had previously concluded the Algiers Accords with Iran,
ending the Tehran hostage crisis. Among other things, the United
States agreed in the Accords to terminate claims pending in U.S.
courts against Iran and transfer them to an international arbitral
tribunal. Dames & Moore had a state-law claim against Iran and a
pre-judgment attachment on Iranian assets. President Reagan,
upon succeeding Carter, issued an executive order that terminated
Dames & Moore's claim.38 At the Supreme Court, the case posed
the question whether Reagan's order displaced the state law. The
Court found that it did.

34. Id. at 524.
35. Id. at 530.
36. That is, an international agreement concluded on behalf of the President without
the formal approval of either Congress or a supermajority of the Senate. See Louis
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 219-24 (2d ed.
1996).
37. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
3& 1d. at 664-65.
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In a sense, Dames & Moore replayed Youngstown with an
opposite result. But there were two important differences. First,
Reagan's order rested upon the Algiers Accords, an executive
agreement. Executive agreements of course are not part of Article
VI's list of preemptive federal laws. Nonetheless, in two preYoungstown cases, United States v. Belmont and United States v.
Pink, the Court had given preemptive effect to an executive
agreement that conflicted with state law. Although executive
the Court
agreements were not technically Article II treaties,
39
concluded, they should be given the same status.
The Court in Dames & Moore might have rested simply on
Pink and Belmont. But those cases had been decided in an earlier
era, on the express or implied authority of United States v. CurtissWright Export Co., a 1936 decision that announced broad
extraconstitutional presidential authority in foreign affairs. ') In
Youngstown, Justice Black had firmly declared-in open rebuke of
Curtiss-Wright-that all presidential powers had to be grounded
either in the Constitution or a federal treaty or statute.4 No Justice
concurring or dissenting in Youngstown challenged this
proposition. Though the specific result of Pink and Belmont might
be defended on the ground that these cases involved the
President's specific constitutional power of recognizing foreign
governments, 2 their broader claims about presidential power
might need to be rethought.
Thus, in addition to the executive agreement, the Court in
Dames & Moore focused on the second key difference between
that case and Youngstown. "Crucial to our decision today," Justice
William Rehnquist wrote, "is the conclusion that Congress has
implicitly approved the practice of claim settlement by executive
agreement."43 As the Court explained, there was a long pattern of
congressional acquiescence in presidential settlement agreements.
These settlements dated to early post-ratification. practice,' and
39. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229-30 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301
U.S. 324,330 (1937).
40. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); see Michael D.
Ramsey, The Myth of Extraconstitutional Foreign Affairs Power, 42 WILLIAM & MARY L.
REV. 379 (2000) (describing and criticizing this aspect of the case).
41. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
42- See HENKIN, supra note 36, at 219-22.
43. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 680.
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they had very often been done by executive agreement. Congress
had frequently enacted legislation to implement unilateral
executive settlement agreements, and it had not objected to the
President's practice.' The Court invoked Jackson's Youngstown
concurrence, finding that the case fell into Jackson's category of
presidential acts with congressional approval-which, Jackson had
said, would almost always be constitutionally defensible." As a
result, the Court in Dames & Moore made clear that its holding
was narrow and that congressional approval was central to it: "In
light of all of the foregoing-the inferences to be drawn from the
character of the legislation Congress has enacted in the area...
and from the history of acquiescence in executive claims
settlement-we conclude that the President was authorized to
suspend pending claims....""
Dames & Moore may be criticized on various grounds. Just
two years later, the Court held in INS v. Chadha that Congress
must act formally in accordance with Article I, Section 7's
bicameralism and presentment clauses if it wants to alter legal
rights.47 And even if Congress' informal acquiescence would suffice
to convey power on the President, it was dubious whether
Congress had acquiesced to preemptive presidential settlements.
The long historical record the Court invoked did not (aside from
the single agreement at issue in Pink and Belmont) involve
settlements that displaced state law." But even taken on its own
terms, Dames & Moore does not suggest a broad view of
presidential preemptive power, and indeed it arguably cuts back
on the sweep of Pink and Belmont by focusing on congressional
approval in the specific context of claims settlement agreements.
That conclusion is supported by the Court's next major case
in the field, Barclays Bank PLC v. FranchiseTax Board.49 Barclays
was a challenge to California's method of calculating state taxes
for multinational enterprises, called "worldwide combined
reporting," which was different from most other jurisdictions and
44. Id. at 680-81.
45. Id. at 686. The Court also invoked Frankfurter's Youngstown suggestion that
longstanding practice might provide a "gloss" on the text. Id.
46. id.
47. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
4K See Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power, 77
N.C. L. REV. 133 (1998) [hereinafter Ramsey, Executive Agreements].
49. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
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much more favorable to the state. The multinational corporate
petitioner, supported by an array of foreign governmentsU
challenged the tax as unconstitutional, in part because the
executive branch had opposed it and found it to interfere with
executive conduct of foreign affairs.
The Court, however, emphasized that Congress was the
lawmaker with respect to foreign commerce, and while Congress
had considered proposals to override California's tax, it had
ultimately declined to act. Preemption, the Court insisted, comes
from Congress. What the petitioner corporation wanted51 was
executive preemption, which the Constitution does not recognize.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg explained for the majority:
[Petitioner] points to a series of Executive Branch actions,
statements, and amicus filings... [and contends] that, taken
together, these Executive pronouncements constitute a "clear
federal directive" proscribing States' use of worldwide
combined reporting.
The Executive statements to which [petitioner] refers,
however, cannot perform the service for which [petitioner]
would enlist them. The Constitution expressly grants Congress,
not the President, the power to "regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations.... "
... Executive Branch actions-press releases, letters, and
amicus briefs-on which [petitioner] here relies are merely
precatory. Executive Branch communications that express
federal policy but lack the force of law cannot render
unconstitutional California's otherwise valid, congressionally
52
condoned, use of worldwide combined reporting.
By 1998, the executive branch appeared to acquiesce in
Ginsburg's view. Breard v. Greene,' decided that year, involved
facts very similar to Medellin. Breaid, a Paraguayan citizen, had
been convicted of murder and sentenced to death in Virginia. He

50. Id. at 324 n.22.
51. The President argued that while a clear presidential position would have the
effect for which the petitioner contended, that position had not been sufficiently
established at the time of relevant events in the case. id. at 330 n.32 (explaining the
executive brach position).
5- Id. at 328-30 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
53. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998);see Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist
Constitution,and the InternationalistConception,51 STAN. L. REv. 529 (1999).
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belatedly objected that he had not been allowed to contact his
consulate, in violation of the VCCR. The relevant state and
federal courts upheld the sentence and conviction on the basis of
Virginia's procedural bar on untimely objections. Paraguay, like
Mexico after it, took the case to the ICJ under the VCCR's
optional protocol. But unlike in Medellin, the ICJ case was still
pending at the time of Breard's scheduled executtion. The ICJ
issued an order directing that the execution be stayed, but both the
United States and Virginia denied that such an order was binding,
and the Supreme Court appeared to assume (perhaps wrongly)
that Virginia was under no Article VI duty to give Breard a
remedy. 4 On these facts President Clinton admitted that he had no
constitutional authority to interfere with the implementation of
Virginia's laws, and could only ask the state to grant a stay. The
U.S. brief conceded: "The measures at the United States' disposal
under our Constitution may in some cases include only persuasion
- such as the Secretary of State's request to the Governor of
Virginia to stay Breard's execution - and not legal compulsion
through the judicial process. That is the situation here." 5
The Court apparently agreed, observing:
Last night the [U.S.] Secretary of State sent a letter to the
Governor of Virginia requesting that he stay Breard's
execution. If the Governor wishes [to do so]... that is his
prerogative. But nothing in our existing case law allows us to
make that choice for him.The final case in this series-and the one invoked most
heavily in Movsesian-is American Insurance Association v.
Garamendi7 Prior to Garamendi,as we have seen, there was little
54. See Carlos Manuel Vizquez, Breard and the Federal Power to Require
Compliance with lCI Orders of Provisional Measures, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 683 (1998).
55. Jonathan 1.Charney & W. Michael Reisman, Agora: Breard, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 666, 673
(1998) (quoting the U.S. brief in Breard, at 49-51) (internal quotations omitted); see also Curtis
A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Abiding Relevance of Federalism to U.S. Foreign

Relations, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 675 (1998) (discussing and endorsing the executive branch
position).
56. Breard, 523 U.S. at 378.
57. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 394 (2003). For a critical account of the
case and its implications, see Brannon P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, American
Insurance Association v. Garamendi and Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 825 (2004). For further structural criticism, see Bradford R. Clark,
Domesticating Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L. REV. 1573 (2007); Michael P. Van Alstine,
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textual or precedential support for executive preemption aside
from executive agreements implicitly approved by Congress.
Garamendi seemed to go much further, invalidating a California
law that required insurance companies doing business in California
to provide lists of policyholders to whom they had issued insurance
prior to and during the Holocaust. The executive branch was in the
process- of negotiating settlements for Holocaust-era claims,
including insurance claims. Executive agreements had been
concluded with several key countries, including Germany, but
these executive agreements did not clearly preempt California's
law.5
Justice David Souter reasoned for the majority that even if
the executive agreements were not in themselves preemptive, they
reflected a presidential policy that Holocaust-era claims should be
resolved through the executive branch negotiations. Analogizing
to the statutory preemption of state laws interfering with executive
foreign policy in the recent decision in Crosby v. National Foreign
Trade Council,' Souter held that the policies underlying the
executive agreements in Garamendihad the same effect.61'
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg - sounding themes from her
Barclays majority - rightly objected that Crosby was not at all on
point because Crosby was a conventional Article VI preemption
case: the whole difficulty in Garamendi was that no Article VI
source of law existed. Ginsburg was willing to accept preemption
by executive agreement so long as the preemptive intent and
effects were clear, but she found the executive agreements in the
particular case to lack clarity and was unwilling to recognize a
broader version of executive foreign policy preemption."
IV.

MEDELLIN*AND GARAMENDI

Not surprisingly, the President's brief in Medellin relied
Executive Aggrandizement in ForeignAffairs Lawmaking, 54 UCLA L. REV. 309 (2006).
58 See Denning & Ramsey, supra note 57, at 860-62.
59. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000), In Crosby, the Court
found a Massachusetts law restricting companies from doing business in Burma to be
preempted by a federal statute imposing similar but more limited and flexible sanctions on
Burma. See Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 SuP. CT. REV.
175.
60. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 423-28.
61. Id. at 430-43.
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heavily on Garamendi. The Garamendi decision, the President
argued, recognized that state law must give way to executive
foreign policy, as the President contended it must also do in
Medellin. Thus President Bush claimed the power, exercised
through his memorandum, to "establish binding rules of decision
that preempt contrary state law," including the Texas procedural
bar applied against Medellin." Indeed, in at least two respects
Medellin was a better case for the President than Garamendi.First,
the President was directly implementing the clear command of a
treaty, Article 94 of the U.N. Charter. Although Article 94 was not
(according to the President) preemptive of its own effect, the
President was surely on stronger preemptive ground than in
Garamendi,where there was no applicable treaty and only a group
of ambiguous and loosely applicable executive agreements.
Second, in Medellin the President had issued a formal statement
calling for preemption. In Garamendi, Ginsburg's dissent had
distinguished between formal and informal executive actions,
saying that the former had greater claims to be preemptive.'
Although Medellin lacked an executive agreement, the President
could claim greater formality on two fronts-the treaty itself and
the President's memorandum. Taken with the other cases
recognizing the President's power to settle claims (Dames &
Moore, Pink, and Belmont), the President argued that "the
Memorandum is a valid exercise of the President's foreign affairs
authority to resolve claims disputes with foreign nations. '
In response, the Court in Medellin (per Chief Justice John
Roberts) limited Garamendi to its facts (and indeed, to a
somewhat recast version of its facts). Garamendi,Roberts' opinion
began by saying, was one of "a series of cases in which this Court
has upheld the authority of the President to settle foreign claims
pursuant to an executive agreement.... "The claims-settlement
cases," the Court continued, "involve a narrow set of
circumstances: the making of executive agreements to settle civil
claims between American citizens and foreign governments or
62. U.S. Medellin Brief, supra note 28, at 5.
63. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 442-43.
64. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U'.S. 491,530 (2008).
65. Id. (citing Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 415; Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,
679-80 (1981); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1941); United States v. Belmont,
301 U.S. 324,330 (1937)).
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foreign nationals."66 Moreover, according to the Court, those cases
relied on
congressional assent established by longstanding
executive practice. Quoting Dames & Moore, Roberts continued:
"[T]he limitations on this source of executive power are clearly set
forth and the Court has been careful to note that '[p]ast practice
does not, by itself, create power.' '6 7 In short, Garamendi, like
Dames & Moore, was about the power to make executive claimssettlement agreements with the tacit consent of Congress. As such,
the Court maintained, Garamendi was not relevant to Medellin,
where there was no executive agreement, where exercise of the
President's power was (leaving aside the executive agreement
cases) unprecedented, and where there was no evidence of
congressional consent.
As we have seen, this description of Garamendi may appear
somewhat at odds with the question Garamendi actually posed.
The Court's reading, however, indicates that it had come to
appreciate the fundamental threat to constitutional structure
posed by a broad reading of Garamendi that gave preemptive
effect to mere presidential policy. The Bush administration's
interpretation of Garamendi would convert the President into a
unilateral lawmaker in foreign affairs. Drawing the line at
executive agreements at least forced the President to gain the
approval of a foreign nation; President Bush wanted to make law
by memorandum.
As a result, Medellin imposes a strikingly limited reading
upon Garamendi. Before Medellin, Garamendi could be read by
both Presidents and academic critics as opening the door to a wide
range of preemptive presidential acts, including unsettling the
analyses and assumptions in Barclays and Breard.' But Medellin
insisted that the key constitutional principles - that preemption
can only come from a lawmaking source and that unadorned
executive foreign policy is not such a source - survived
Garamendi9 Thus Medellin made clear that a state law is
protected from preemption even in the face of a conflicting
presidential foreign policy that was, as the Court said, "plainly
66. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 531.
67. Id. at 531-32 (quoting Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 686).
68. See Denning & Ramsey, supra note 57, at 868-98.
69. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 523-24.
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compelling."7"
V. MEDELLIN AND THE "NEGATIVE ON STATE LAWS"

At this point, it may be useful to take a step back from recent
cases to consider the broader constitutional structure. At the 1787
Convention in Philadelphia, James Madison pressed repeatedly to
give Congress what he called a "negative" on (that is, a veto over)
any state laws "which they [i.e., Congress] shd. judge to be
improper.',71 Madison distrusted state legislatures but doubted that
the Constitution itself could, or should, attempt to directly restrict
all the harmful practices in which they might engage. Rather,
through the "negative," his idea was to give Congress a
supervisory power over the states. This power, Madison thought,
was essential to preserve an effective Union."
Madison, even at the time of the Convention, was no general
foe of state power, despite his concerns. To those who feared the
negative as a cover for consolidation of power in the national
government, he presumably would have offered the following
explanation. The negative would come with substantial procedural
hurdles. It would carry the burdens of bicameralism and
presentment. It would need to gain a majority in the Senate, whose
members were, under the original Constitution, selected by the
state legislators.7" Any substantial effort to interfere with state
prerogatives would be unlikely to survive.
Madison's fellow delegates nonetheless defeated the negative,
objecting in strong terms and voting it down on several occasions."4
Given the closeness of the ratification vote in key states and the
focus given in the ratification debates to the dangers of
centralization at the expense of the states, one may speculate that
had the negative been included, ratification might have been in
great doubt. Ironically, though, the expansion of Congress'
legislative power, especially through the Court's expansion of the
70. Id. at 524. It should be remembered - as Medellin noted - that the President does
not lack a remedy. Presumably the President can almost always displace state laws
implicating foreign affairs by secure passage of an act of Congress or approval of a selfexecuting treaty - that is, by acting through the procedure set forth in Article VI.
71. James Madison, Notes, in 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
at 164 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
72 Id.
73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
74. See Madison, supra note 71, at 22-23,164-67.
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Commerce Clause, means that today Congress exercises
something very close to Madison's negative. Congress can
invalidate a broad range of state laws simply by passing
inconsistent legislation in areas where it has power to legislate.
Moreover, the Seventeenth Amendment removed one protection
of the states in the original design by making Senators directly
elected instead of appointed by the states.
Despite these changes, scholars of federalism remain
convinced of the (at least partial) efficacy of our constitutional
system as a protection of federalism. The representation of the
states in Congress (despite its dilution in the Seventeenth
Amendment), and the relative difficulty of making federal law,
formed the centerpiece of What Herbert Wechsler in a classic
article famously called the "political safeguards of federalism."75
As Bradford Clark has explained more recently:
The Founders understood that the means established for
adopting federal law would have a direct impact on federalism.
Some of the most potent safeguards of federalism, for example,
derive from a surprising source: the Supremacy Clause.
Although the Supremacy Clause performs the familiar function
of securing the primacy of federal law over contrary state law, it
also necessarily constrains the exercise of federal power by
recognizing only three sources of law as "the supreme Law of
the Land." . . . . The Founders, in turn, prescribed finely

wrought and exhaustively considered procedures elsewhere in
the Constitution to govern the adoption of each type of law
recognized by the Supremacy Clause.... [Flederal lawmaking
procedures... preserve federalism both by making federal law
more difficult to adopt, and by assigning lawmaking power
solely to actors subject to the political safeguards of federalism.
The text, structure, and history of the Constitution, moreover,
suggest that these procedures were meant to be the exclusive
means of adopting "the supreme Law of the Land." Permitting
the federal government to avoid these constraints would allow
it to exercise more power than the Constitution contemplates,
at the expense of state authority. "

75. Herbert Wechsler, Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of (he States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543, 558
(1954).
76. Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEx. L.
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The matter may also be explored from the framers'
perspective on separation of powers. At the Convention,
Madison's future co-author, Alexander Hamilton, expressed an
idea even more unpopular than Madison's negative: that the
United States should have an elective monarchy, with executive
powers modeled fairly transparently on those of the English king.'
Hamilton did not even bother putting his proposal to a vote.
History has treated Hamilton unkindly in some respects with
regard to this proposal, for Hamilton did not propose a simple recreation of the English monarchy. He would have re-allocated
significant powers to Congress, including, for example, the power
to declare war; but Hamilton surely saw the English monarchy as
his inspiration.
One thing Hamilton did not propose, however, was giving the
executive the power to change law by decree. As noted above, this
would have been an extraordinary change even from the
perspective of the English model. What set England apart from the
major eighteenth-century continental monarchies was that the
English king was bound by law and was not himself a lawmaking
authority." Like the other key limit on English monarchical
power-lack of power over expenditure-lack of lawmaking
power forced the English king to cooperate with Parliament
because the king had limited ability to govern on his own.
It is worth considering the extent to which executive
preemption departs from these basic principles. Executive
preemption would give the President the "negative" that Madison
would have placed with Congress. In the version advanced by the
Bush administration in Medellin, it would allow the President a
supervisory power over state laws that the President found
inconvenient to national policy. And the President could exercise
this power without any of the political safeguards of federalism
identified as crucial by Professors Clark and Wechsler.
To be sure, this power, as claimed by the President in
Medellin, would only apply to matters that implicated the
REV. 1321, 1323-24 (20(11) (footnotes and some internal quotations omitted); see also
RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION'S TEXT, supra note 8, at 286-87.
77. See CHRISTOPHER COLLIER & JAMES LINCOLN COLLIER, DECISION IN
PHILADELPHIA: THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 76-77 (1986)
(discussing Hamilton).
78. See THE FEDERALIST No.47 (James Madison), supranote 9, at 304.
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President's foreign policies. But especially in the modern era in
which "globalization" has become a clich6, the range of state
policies potentially implicating foreign affairs seems substantial
almost to the point of limitless. States' economic regulations
increasingly raise international issues because of economic
connectedness, as shown in Barclays and Garamendi. States'
criminal laws increasingly raise international issues, not just
because-as seen in Breard and Medellin itself-states come in
contact with more foreign nationals, but also because international
opinion has become more interested in how nations treat their
own nationals. Thus, not only did Texas' treatment of a foreign
national raise foreign policy issues in Medellin, but in several other
cases international concern has been expressed over the way Texas
treated its own citizens. There now seems to be no coherent line, if
there ever was one, between local issues and international issues.
Similarly, executive preemption redistributes power among
the federal branches. States acting contrary to the President's
wishes, as Texas did in Medellin, are a check on the President's
power. They are a direct check, of course, because they are an
obstacle to the President achieving a particular goal. They are a
broader check as well, because they force the President to enlist
Congress' support to achieve goals, and Congress may exact a
price in other areas. The more the President has power to clear
obstacles unilaterally, the less a President is likely to forge a
cooperative relationship with Congress.79
Again, it may be objected that executive preemption applies
only to foreign affairs, where we have traditionally accepted
broader presidential initiative. This objection, however, seems to
get matters backwards. To the extent we accept presidential
initiative in foreign affairs, we are comforted by the fact that the
President's power to impose domestic consequences of
presidential foreign policy is limited. The President's broad
diplomatic powers, for example, have little immediate effect
locally. But that is because we place federal lawmaking power,
including preemptive power, in other branches.

79. For an elaboration on the separation of powers implications of executive
preemption, see Denning & Ramsey, supra note 57, at 898-915.
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VI. CONCLUSION: MEDELLIN AND MOVSESIAN

In conclusion, I will bring the discussion back to the
Movsesian case and the broader issue of states seeking to provide
remedies for international wrongs. Undeniably, such efforts may
conflict with presidential foreign policy. Assuming the state
remedies are otherwise constitutional, the question is whether the
President's policy, standing alone, should displace state law.
The Ninth Circuit held in Movsesian, largely on the authority
of Garamendi, that the President's policy with respect to the
Armenian Genocide preempted California's law. We should see
that the court got the first step right: it correctly described the
issue as one of executive preemption." We should also now see
that, at minimum, its reliance on Garamendi an incomplete
assessment. Medellin substantially rejected the broad reading of
Garamendi proposed by the President, which is essentially the
reading on which the Ninth Circuit relied. "1 Medellin instead
indicated that Garamendishould be limited to its facts-and to a
limited version of its facts in which the executive agreements
should be seen as the basis for preemption. In effect, it adopted
Justice Ginsburg's dissent (although it viewed Garamendi's facts
differently than she did).82 Because there was no executive
agreement in Movsesian, it was more akin to Medellin than
Garamendi.3 As a result, its uncritical reliance on Garamendi is
80. See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 578 F.3d 1052, 1063 (9th Cir. 2009)
("California Code of Civil Procedure § 354.4 is preempted because it directly conflicts with
the Executive Branch's foreign policy refusing to provide official recognition to the
'Armenian Genocide."').
81. The Ninth Circuit described Garamendi as follows: "InGaramendi, the Supreme
Court recognized for the first time that 'presidential foreign policy' itself may carry the
same preemptive force as a federal statute or treaty. Unlike in previous cases, the
presidential foreign policy was not contained in a single executive agreement .... In sum,
the Court held that in the realm of foreign affairs, 'Itihe exercise of the federal executive
authority means that state law must give way where ...there is evidence of clear conflict
between the policies adopted by the two."' Id. at 1056 (quoting Am. Ins. Ass'n v.
Garamendi, 539 U.S. 394, 421-23 (2003)) (citations omitted)). This description is not
necessarily inaccurate, but it is one that the Court rejected in Medellin. See supra Part IV.
82. That is, unlike Ginsburg's dissent, the Medellin majority saw the executive agreements
in Garamendito be preemptive.
83. To be clear, the mere existence of an executive agreement should not
automatically establish preemption, either under the Court's view or under basic
constitutional principles. Substantial scholarship has questioned the fundamental basis of
preemption by executive agreement or called for its sharp limitation. See Ramsey,
Executive Agreements, supra note 48, at 218-235; David Sloss, InternationalAgreements
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problematic.
Further, the Ninth Circuit did not grapple with the basic
constitutional principles set forth in Youngstown and reaffirmed in
Medellin. Medellin makes two things clear: Justice Black's simple
proposition-that the President is not a lawmaker-retains its
vitality; and that proposition rejects the broad view of executive
preemption. Preemption is lawmaking. That is the fundamental
message of both Youngstown and Medellin.
There may be a more limited way to defend Movsesian's
result, though ultimately I find it unavailing. As discussed, limiting
executive preemption to foreign affairs is no limit, because almost
everything may affect foreign affairs, and if the President claims
that something affects foreign affairs, the courts are ill-suited for
second-guessing. Perhaps, though, one might say that courts could
and should undertake a balancing test, assessing the relative
strengths of the state's interest and the foreign affairs interest.
Matters within states' traditional areas of regulation-criminal law
(Medellin), property (Youngstown), or tax (Barclays)-might be
more defensible than state attempts to right international wrongs
(Garamendi, Movsesian). Indeed, in a companion case to
Movsesian, Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum, the Ninth Circuit
adopted something like this test. to assess arguments of
constitutional preemption under Zschernig v. Miller.'
This approach to executive preemption seems mistaken for at
least two reasons. The Supreme Court's cases suggest categorical
rules, not balancing. Medellin and Youngstown are categorical in
rejecting executive preemption, not in particular contexts, but on
broad constitutional principles. It is true that Garamendi can be
read to invite a balancing test,'5 but Medellin declined to take that
route, even though such an approach offered a possible alternative
way to distinguish Garamendi. Instead, the Court rested on the
categorical distinction between executive agreements and mere
executive foreign policy. Second, there are good reasons to think

and the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1963 (2003); Clark, supra
note 57; Van Alstine, supra note 57.
84. Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 578 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2009);
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (recognizing a "dormant" foreign affairs power
that excluded certain state activities even in the absence of a conflicting federal policy.
85. See Denning & Ramsey, supra note.57, at 925-36.

2010]

InternationalWrongs

the balancing approach unworkable. No useful standards exist to
identify what is or is not within a state's interest, and much will
depend on debatable descriptions of the state law's purpose in
particular cases. For example, the law at issue in Garamendimight
seem within the state's interest if that interest is described (as
California described it) as assuring that insurance companies
operating in California treat policyholders fairly. The Supreme
Court in Garamendi denigrated California's interest by
redescribing it as an attempt to force a particular result upon
overseas claims. Neither description seems indisputably correct,
and indeed the law may seem to contain a bit of both. And even
with respect to overseas claims, one might think that states have an
interest in securing justice for their own citizens. It seems likely
that almost any such case would turn more upon judicial intuition
than upon any predictable test. These concerns likely led the
Medellin Court away from attempts at balancing and instead
toward a reaffirmation of basic constitutional principles.
In sum, the Constitution establishes two clear rules. One,
state law prevails unless federal law displaces it. Two, the
President alone cannot make federal law. If the President wants
state law displaced because it conflicts with presidential foreign
policy, the Constitution prescribes two routes by which the
President may achieve that result: by the approval of Congress or
(in the case of a treaty) the approval of a supermajority of the
Senate. In Youngstown and again in Medellin, the Court reminded
the President of the rules. And those rules should apply as well
where states seek to remedy international wrongs - even where
that proves inconvenient to the President.

